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An Analysis of Assault
and Attempts to Assault
It has often been said that an "attempt to assault" is a
logical absurdity. After describing the different concepts
of assault and how they have developed, Professor Per-
kins analyzes the current meaning of attempt to assault.
He concludes that there are four situations in which an
attempt to assault has been made a punishable offense.
Professor Perkins also discusses and supports the re-
lated notion that every battery includes an assault.
Rollin M. Perkins*
An oft-repeated comment is that there is no such offense known
to the law as an attempt to commit an assault.' The problems andimplications involved in this comment are entitled to more exten-
sive examination than they seem to have been accorded.
I. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF ASSAULT
In the early law the word "assault" represented an entirely dif-
ferent concept in criminal law than it did in the law of torts. As
an offense it was an attempt to commit a battery; as a basis for
a civil action for damages it was an intentional act wrongfully plac-
ing another in apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.'
The distinction has frequently passed unnoticed because a misdeed
involving either usually involves both. If, with the intention of
hitting X, D wrongfully threw a stone that X barely managed to
dodge, then D would have been guilty of a criminal assault be-
cause he had attempted to commit a battery, and he would also
have been liable in a civil action of trespass for assault because he
had wrongfully placed X in apprehension of physical harm.
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See,. e.g., Green v; State, 82 Ga. App. 402, 405, 61 S.E.2d 291, 293(1950); White v. State, 22 Tex. 608, 609 (1858); Brown v. State, 7 Tex.
Crim. -569 (1880).
2. For a discussion of this development, see PERKIas, CRIMINAL LAw
86-93 (1957). Apparently if we go back far enough, we come to the time
when the civil action of trespass for assault was "an action brought by the
person -aggrieved by the actor's attempt to commit a battery upon him."
RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 24, comment c at 54 (1934).
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Some commentators have been so imbued with the tort theory
of assault that they have had difficulty in realizing that in the
early law a criminal assault was an attempt to commit a battery
and that only. In the words of one notewriter, the "offense which
the great majority of the courts are calling and punishing as a
criminal assault is in effect an attempted battery, which is, and
probably should be punished as, a distinct and separate criminal
offense."' Research had disclosed to the writer what the courts
were doing, but seemed to leave the impression that they were get-
ting out of line. The present writer has been unable to locate any
case in the English reports that contains a common law indictment
charging "an attempt to commit a battery"; the indictment typically
charged the defendant with an "assault."4
The fact that the original criminal assault was an attempt to com-
mit a battery and nothing else is the reason behind the oft-quoted
comment mentioned at the outset that an attempt to commit an
assault is unknown to the law. In the words of the Georgia court,
"as an assault is itself an attempt to commit a crime, an attempt
to make an assault can only be an attempt to attempt to do it ....
This is simply absurd."5 Except for variations in wording, this has
been the common explanation.6 The same fact accounts for cer-
tain other statements such as that an assault is an inchoate battery;7
that every battery includes an assault;' that battery is a consum-
3. Note, Is a Criminal Assault a Separate Substantive Crime or Is It an
Attempted Battery?, 33 KY. L.J. 189, 196 (1945).
4. But see 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 764 (8th ed. 1892) ("there may
be an indictable attempt to commit a battery"). The only case he cites
in support of the statement is United States v. Lyles, 26 Fed. Cas. 1024
(No. 15646) (C.C.D.C. 1834), which was an indictment for solicitation
to commit a battery, which he says is a "form of attempt." He gives a
cross reference to his own volume 2, § 62, which deals with assault. Hence,
it is obvious he was not referring to an indictment worded in terms of an
attempt to commit a battery.
5. Wilson v. State, 53 Ga. 205, 206 (1874).
6. "As an assault is an attempt to commit a battery, there can be no
attempt to commit an assault." 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE § 72, at 154 (Anderson ed. 1957). "Thus embracery is an attempt
to bribe a juror, an assault an attempt to commit a battery, and there can
be no attempt to commit these offenses." 1 BURDICK, CRIME § 135, at
176 (1946). 'There can be no such offense as an 'attempt to attempt' a
crime. Since a simple assault is nothing more than an attempt to commit
a battery, and aggravated assaults are nothing more than attempts to com-
mit murder, rape, or robbery, an attempt to commit an assault, whether
simple or aggravated is not a crime." CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 218(6th ed. 1958). Accord, 2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 62 (8th ed. 1892);
HOCHHEIMER, CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 266 (2d ed. 1904).
7. Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 624, 98 N.E. 640, 641 (1912); People
v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 525, 5 N.W. 982, 985 (1880); UNDERHILL,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 684 (5th ed. 1957).
8. Hall v. State, 309 P.2d 1096 (Okla. Crim. 1957); 2 BISHOP, CRIMI-
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mated assault;9 and that one "may obviously be assaulted, although
in complete ignorance of the fact, and, therefore, entirely free
from alarm."1 It explains also why one who has committed a
battery is frequently prosecuted for assault and battery."' This
does not mean that two offenses are charged in separate counts
of the accusatory pleading, but that one offense is charged in one
count under the name of "assault and battery."'2 In substance, at
least in the original usage, it was a charge of a successful attempt to
commit a battery. Not infrequently, however, the charge is merely
an assault although the attack obviously resulted in a battery.' 3
Often a criminal assault has been defined in terms of an attempt to
commit a battery," and the need for an intent to inflict such harm
has been emphasized. 5 "The offer or attempt must be intention-
al," said the Mississippi court, "for if, notwithstanding appear-
NAL LAW § 33 (8th ed. 1892); 1 EAsT, PLEAs or THE CROWN 406 (1803); 1
HAwrms, PLEAS OF THE CRowN 263 (6th ed. 1788). This is not true of
assault as a tort because apprehension on the part of the other is essential.
See PaossER, TORTS § 10, at 37 (2d ed. 1955).
9. Anderson v. Crawford, 265 Fed. 504 (8th Cir. 1920); People v.
Heise, 217 Cal. 671, 673, 20 P.2d 317, 318 (1933); People v. Duchon,
165 Cal. App. 2d 690, 332 P.2d 373 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); May v. Com-
monwealth, 285 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1955); State v. Maier, 13 NJ. 235, 99
A.2d 21 (1953). See also Lawson v. State, 30 Ala. 14 (1857).
10. Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, 465 (1885); accord, People v. Pape,
66 Cal. 366, 5 Pac. 621 (1885); People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N.W.
982 (1880); State v. Cornwell, 97 N.H. 446, 91 A.2d 456 (1952); State
v. Adamo, 9 N.J. Super. 7, 74 A.2d 341 (App. Div. 1950); State v. Wilson,
218 Ore. 575, 346 P.2d 115 (1959). This would not be recognized as an
assault in the law of torts. PROSSER, TORTS § 10, at 35 (2d ed. 1955); RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 22 (1934).
11. Hill v. State, 63 Ga. 578 (1879); Shaw v. State, 239 Ind. 248, 156
N.E.2d 381 (1959); Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144 So. 895 (1932);
State v. Monroe, 121 N.C. 677, 28 S.E. 547 (1897); Saunders v. State, 208
Tenn. 347, 345 S.W.2d 899 (1961). In one prosecution for assault and
battery the evidence indicated "a rather severe beating." Clark v. State,
370 P.2d 46, 50 (Okla. Crim. 1962).
12. See People v. Young, 12 App. Div. 2d 262, 263, 210 N.Y.S.2d 358,
360 (1961), where the court said that "assault and battery is an ancient
crime cognizable at the common law."
13. People v. Moore, 50 Hun 356, 3 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1888);
State v. Hemphill, 162 N.C. 632, 78 S.E. 167 (1913).
14. McKay v. State, 44 Tex. 43, 48 (1875); see Guarro v. United
States, 237 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Lane v. State, 85 Ala. 11,
14, 4 So. 730, 732 (1888); State v. Lasby, 174 A.2d 323, 324 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1961); State v. Rand, 156 Me. 81, 82, 161 A.2d 852, 853 (1960);
Yantz v. Warden, 210 Md. 343, 351, 123 A.2d 601, 606 (1956).
15. Burke v. United States, 282 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1960); State v. Crow,
23 N.C. 375 (1841); see People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 228 P.2d 281
(1951); Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 26 S.E. 748 (1896); State v. Crowl,
135 Mont. 98, 337 P.2d 367 (1959); People v. Lay, 254 App. Div. 372,
5 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1938); Johnson v. State, 43 Tex. 576 (1875); Riley v.
State, 92 Tex. Crim. 237, 243 S.W. 467 (1922).
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ances to the contrary, it can be collected that there is not a present
purpose to do an injury, it is not an assault."' 6
II. THE CHANGING CONCEPT
The tort concept of assault seems to be substantially the same
as it was in the early law,17 but during the years two changes have
tended to creep into the concept of criminal assault, both apparent-
ly making their appearance by inadvertence rather than by de-
sign. The two have moved in different directions, and while many
jurisdictions have greatly enlarged the scope of criminal assault,
a few have restricted its application.
A. CRIMINAL ASSAULT BASED UPON A TORT THEORY
While few jurisdictions have abandoned the original basis for
establishing a criminal assault in the absence of statute,'3 there
has been a tendency in many to add the tort theory as an additional
ground. Where the tort theory has been added, a simple criminal
assault "is made out from either an attempt to commit a battery
or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehen-
sion of receiving an immediate battery."' 9 This position, it may
be added, has now been taken by a majority of the jurisdictions.2"
A notewriter considered this addition to be ground for com-
plaint,"' and there is something to be said for this position. In
each jurisdiction where this was done without the aid of statute,
the first case adopting the new theory naturally resulted in a con-
viction for what had not been defined as a crime at the time the
16. Smith v. State, 39 Miss. 521, 525 (1860); accord, State v. Sears, 86
Mo. 169, 174 (1885); cf. State v. Davis, 23 N.C. 125, 127 (1840).
17. PROSSER, TORTS § 10, at 34-35 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS §§ 21, 22, 24 (1934). A Texas case held that a civil assault was
determined by the definition of criminal assault. Texas Bus Lines v. An-
derson, 233 S.W.2d 961 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), criticized in 30 TEXAS L.
REv. 120 (1951).
18. Sometimes, however, an attempt to commit a battery, the original
basis for criminal assault, seems to have been held not to constitute an
assault. In one case a directed verdict of not guilty was affirmed because
the intended victim did not see the weapon and knew nothing of the threat
until afterwards. State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598, 124 Pac. 775 (1912). In
some cases the tort theory has been emphasized without holding that an
attempt to commit a battery would not of itself constitute a criminal assault.
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Commonwealth v. White,
110 Mass. 407 (1872). Some statutory definitions of criminal assault also
have abandoned the original basis. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-1 (1961).
19. People v. Wood, 10 App. Div. 2d 231, 236, 199 N.Y.S.2d 342,
347 (1960).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.10, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
21. Note, The Misuse of the Tort Definition of Assault in a Criminal
Action, 11 RocKy MT. L. REV. 104 (1939).
[Vol. 47:71
ATTEMPTS TO ASSAULT
"assault" was committed. This did not violate the constitutional
bar against ex post facto laws since that provision is directed to
the legislative body,'m but it clearly violated the underlying
principle that no one should be punished for doing what had not
been defined as a crime at the time it was done.' Had the change
been made by legislative enactment, the courts would not have
permitted it to have retroactive effect. The explanation for this
apparent anomaly is that the change did not come about as a
result of a conscious effort to enlarge the scope of a criminal of-
fense, but as a consequence of the confusion caused by the use of
the same word to represent two different concepts. 24 A threat
of an immediate battery resulting in apprehension, even when in-
tended only as a bluff, is so likely to result in a breach of the peace
that it should be a punishable offense;, 5 hence there need be no
regret that it is an offense in most jurisdictions even if we might
wish that the enlargement of criminal assault had been made pros-
pectively by legislative enactment rather than retroactively by "ju-
dicial legislation."
Where criminal assault has been given this dual scope, a defini-
tion in terms of "an attempt or offer" to commit a battery is
assumed to represent both grounds. The word "offer" signifies a
threat that places the other in reasonable apprehension of receiving
an immediate battery. -6 It would be a mistake, however, to assume
that the word carried any such significance when it first appeared
in the definition of this offense. In one of its meanings, "offer" is
22. "No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONsT. art. I,§ 9. "No State shall... pass any... ex post facto Law .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
23. For a scholarly discussion, see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRnIMNAL LAw 27-69 (2d ed. 1960).
24. See, e.g., State v. Hazen, 160 Kan. 733, 740, 165 P.2d 234, 239
(1946); People v. Wood, 10 App. Div. 2d 231, 236, 199 N.Y.S.2d 342,
347 (1960); State v. Allen, 245 N.C. 185, 189, 95 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1956);
Dunbar v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 275, 131 P.2d 116 (1942); State v. Sims,
3 Strob. 137 (S.C. 1848); State v. Wiley, 52 S.D. 110, 216 N.W. 866
(1927).
25. If "a person presents a pistol which has the appearance of being
loaded, and puts the party into fear and alarm, that is what it is the object
of the law to prevent." Regina v. St. George, 9 Car. & P. 483, 493, 173
Eng. Rep. 921, 926 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1840). See also Richels v. State, 33
Tenn. (1 Sneed) 606 (1854); HOCHEiMER, CR IES AND CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 254 (2d ed. 1904).
26. Thus, in holding an intent to strike unnecessary, the Kansas court
held that an assault is committed by "a wilful offer with force or violence
to'do corporal injury to another . . . if the circumstances are such that
the person threatened reasonably believes the injury will be done." State v.
Hazen, 160 Kan. 733, 740, 165 P.2d 234, 239 (1946). The fact that the
reference is not to an "apparent offer" but to a "wilful offer" is significant.
See also Richels v. State, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 606 (1854).
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a synonym of "attempt." Duplicity of expression was no stranger
in the early law, and when the phrase was first used in this defini-
tion, it was as if it had been worded "an attempt or effort." This
significance is manifest when the court says "the offer or attempt
must be intentional" because if there "is not a present purpose
to do an injury, it is not an assault."27 In fact, a real strain is
placed upon the word "offer" when it is given the meaning of a
mere pretense of impending harm, and the assumption that the
word has this meaning when used in the definition of criminal as-
sault is merely part of the explanation of how the tort theory was
inadvertently added to the offense. Such connotation is employed
only by those who seek to bring the two-fold aspect of criminal as-
sault within its original definition, while writers,28 courts,"0 and
legislators" interested in emphasizing the point make use of a
different form of expression, such as that an assault is either "an
attempt to commit a battery, or the intentional placing of another
in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery."31
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF PRESENT ABILITY
The original concept of criminal assault developed at an earlier
day than the doctrine of criminal attempt in general, and crys-
tallized on a much narrower basis in the sense of a greater degree
of proximity.32 In the words of the Ohio Supreme Court:
27. Smith v. State, 39 Miss. 521, 525 (1860); see Johnson v. State, 35
Ala. 363 (1860); State v. Blackwell, 9 Ala. 79 (1846); State v. Sears,
86 Mo. 169 (1885).
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.10, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959);
Perkins, Non-Homicide Offenses Against the Person, 26 B.U.L. REv. 119,
132 (1946).
29. People v. Wood, 10 App. Div. 2d 231, 199 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1960).
30. LA. REv. STAT. § 14:36 (1951).
31. Ibid. See also STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 237 (9th
ed. 1950):
An assault is
(a) an attempt unlawfully to apply the least actual force to the person
of another directly or indirectly,
(b) the act of using a gesture towards another giving him reasonable
grounds to believe that the person using that gesture meant to apply
such actual force to his person as aforesaid,
(c) the act of depriving another of his liberty.
32. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 495 (1957). In State v. Davis, 23 N.C.
125, 127 (1840), an early North Carolina court said:
It is difficult in practice, to draw the precise line which separates vio-
lence menaced, from violence begun to be executed-for until the
execution of it is begun, there can be no assault. We think, however,
that where an unequivocal purpose of violence is accompanied by any
act, which, if not stopped--or diverted-will be followed by personal




The distinction may be thus defined: An assault is an act done toward
the commission of a battery; it must precede the battery, but it does
so immediately. The next movement would, at least to all appearance,
complete the battery ... [Ala act constituting an attempt to commit
a felony may be more remote . . ..
The emphasis here was upon the very strict interpretation of
"proximity" in the law of assault. In making the same point, but
with the emphasis upon the more liberal interpretation in the law
of criminal attempt in general, it has been said: "This is a clear
recognition of the principle that an attempt, or the overt act which
is the initial stage thereof, does not require a physical act in the
way of an assault or advance upon the person of the intended
victim."' Therefore, since one may be guilty of an attempt to
commit murder or rape, for example, without coming close enough
to his intended victim to commit an assault,' it follows that the
attempt is a lesser included offense in a prosecution for an ag-
gravated assault of that nature. 6
At times this difference in the requirement of proximity has
found expression in statutes that provide for conviction of an at-
tempt to commit murder where the attempt is by "any means not
constituting the crime of assault with intent to murder,"' or for
conviction of an attempt to commit rape where the attempt was
"not such as to bring it within the definition of an assault with
intent to commit rape . . . ."I There has been some relaxation
in the degree of proximity required,3" but in the early days there
was no assault until the assailant came within apparent reach of
his intended victim.4" This fact is helpful in understanding some
of the early references to assault.
33. Fox v. State, 34 Ohio St. 377, 380 (1878), quoted in part in State
v. Green, 84 Ohio App. 298, 303, 82 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1948). See also
State v. Hetzel, 159 Ohio St. 350, 112 N.E.2d 369 (1953).
34. State v. Mortensen, 95 Utah 541, 550, 83 P.2d 261, 265 (1938)
(Hanson, J., dissenting). See also Valley v. State, 203 Tens. 80, 309
S.W.2d 374 (1957).
35. People v. Welsh, 7 Cal. 2d 209, 60 P.2d 124 (1936); Ramsey v.
State, 204 Ind. 212, 183 N.E. 648 (1932).
36. People v. Rupp, 41 Cal. 2d 371, 260 P.2d 1 (1953); People v.
Miller, 17 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). But see State v. Hewitt,
158 N.C. 627, 74 S.E. 356 (1912), in which the difference in the re-
quirement of proximity was overlooked. See also 21 MINN. L. REv. 213
(1937).
37. MicH. CoMP. LAws § 750.91 (1948).
38. TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1190 (1948).
39. Where D advanced upon X with a stick in a threatening manner,
he was held guilty of assault even though he was stopped by Y before he
was within striking distance of X. State v. Vannoy, 65 N.C. 532 (1871);
accord, People v. Bird, 60 Cal. 7 (1881); People v. Hunter, 71 Cal. App.
315, 235 Pac. 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925).
40. Lane v. State, 85 Ala. 11, 4 So. 730 (1887); State v. Straub, 190
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Apart from legal usage, "assault" means an attack, and that was
its meaning when it first appeared in the law. The phrase "pre-
meditated assault" is older than "malice aforethought,"'" and even
the civil action of trespass for assault was originally based upon an
attack." Coke and Hale seem to have been too exclusively inter-
ested in felonies to bother with a definition of assault, although
each used the term as meaning an attack. 3 Hawkins said that
"an assault is an attempt, or offer, with force and violence, to do
a corporal hurt to another; as by striking at him with, or without,
a weapon; or presenting a gun at him, at such a distance to which
the gun will carry . . ."'I Blackstone's definition was "an at-
tempt or offer to beat another."4 East indicated that:
[A]n assault is any attempt or offer with force and violence to do a
corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness; as by
striking at him, or even holding up one's fist at him in a threatening
or insulting manner, or with such other circumstances as denote at the
time an intention, coupled with a present ability of using actual violence
against his person; as by pointing a weapon at him within the reach
of it.46
Three comments are necessary. First, neither Hawkins nor Black-
stone mentioned "present ability," and East did not include this
phrase in his definition, but only used it by way of illustration.
Second, East's reference to "present ability" was obviously meant
to emphasize the requirement of proximity rather than any notion
Iowa 800, 180 N.W. 869 (1921); People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N.W.
982 (1880); Fox v. State, 34 Ohio St. 377 (1878).
41. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 468 (2d ed.
1899). This meaning has tended to persist in the criminal law except where
the tort theory has been added. E.g., Offences Against the Person Act, 1861,
24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, §§ 37 ("Whoever shall assault and strike or wound
.. . "), 47 ("Whoever shall be convicted upon an indictment of any as-
sault occasioning actual bodily harm . . . ").
42. It was "an action brought by the person aggrieved by the actor's
attempt to commit a battery upon him." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 24,
comment c (1934).
43. COKE, INSTITUTES, pt. 3, at 54 (1648); 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 425 (1736).
44. 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 263 (Leach 6th ed. 1788).
45. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120. This is in the third book
dealing with "private wrongs." In the fourth book dealing with "public
wrongs" he says of assault: "I have nothing further to add to what has
already been observed in the preceding book . . . . " 4 id. at *216. There
is no indication of awareness of any difference between assault as a crime
and assault as a tort, but he seems to be thinking in terms of the former.
Of assault he says: "This also is an inchoate violence .. .and therefore,
though no actual suffering is proved, yet the party injured may have re-
dress. . . " 3 id. at *120.
46. 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 406 (1803).
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of actual present ability, for otherwise his illustration would have
been in terms of "pointing a loaded weapon." Third, the inadver-
tent addition of the tort theory to the concept of criminal assault
may have had its inception in the statement by East.47 The state-
ment that he was about to comment on "common assaults and
batteries" for which there are "civil" remedies, which immediately
preceded his definition of a criminal assault, indicates that he was
thinking of assault as a crime and as a tort, with no appreciation
of the difference between the two. That he was not thinking of
assault exclusively in terms of the apprehension of the other party
is shown by the words immediately following his definition of
assault-"where the injury is actually inflicted, it amounts to a
battery, (which includes an assault;) ...."s
One English case that did not involve assault took the position
that there could be no attempt to commit a crime if perpetration
was impossible under the circumstances, 9 but this position was
later repudiated in England50 and has not been followed in this
country.51 Although there is no legally recognized attempt to com-
mit a crime unless the perpetration appeared to be possible to the
one who is claimed to have made the attempt, actual present pos-
sibility is not required.52 In this connection, the prevailing view
quite soundly holds that apparent possibility is sufficient for an
assault,53 as where the offense was committed with an unloaded
47. Ibid. Possibly the inadvertent addition should be attributed to Black-
stone. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120.
48. 1 EAST, op. cit. supra note 46, at 406.
49. Regina v. Collins, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 497 (Ct. Crim. App. 1864)
(no attempt to commit larceny by reaching into an empty pocket).
50. Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox Crim. Cas. 491 (Crown Cas. Res. 1892).
51. State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862); Commonwealth v. Williams,
312 Mass. 553, 45 N.E.2d 740 (1942); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 59
Mass. (5 Pick.) 365 (1850); People v. Moran, 123 N.Y. 254, 25 N.E. 412
(1890).
52. WILLIAMS, C;RmnA.. LAw 635 (2d ed. 1961).
53. De Graff v. State, 34 Ala. App. 137, 37 So. 2d 130 (1948); State
v. Paxson, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 249, 99 Atl. 46 (1916); State v. Hazen,
160 Kan. 733, 165 P.2d 234 (1946); State v. Adamo, 9 NJ. Super. 7, 74
A.2d 341 (App. Div. 1950); State v. McIver, 231 N.C. 313, 56 S.E.2d 604
(1949); Fox v. State, 34 Ohio St. 377 (1878); State v. Linville, 127 Ore.
565, 273 Pac. 338 (1928); State v. Wiley, 52 S.D. 110, 216 N.W. 866(1927); State v. Deso, 110 Vt. 1, 1 A.2d 710 (1938); State v. Shaffer, 120
Wash. 345, 207 Pac. 229 (1922); Regina v. St. George, 9 Car. & P. 483,
493, 173 Eng. Rep. 921, 926 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1840). In State v. Swails, 8
Ind. 524 (1857), it was held that there was no assault without both intent
and present ability, but this was expressly repudiated in Kunkle v. State,
32 Ind. 220 (1869). Present ability is now required by statute in Indiana.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-402 (1956).
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weapon.54 It is true that most of the cases cited are from juris-
dictions in which criminal assault has been enlarged by the addi-
tion of the tort theory, and obviously an unloaded weapon could
cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of one who believed it
was loaded. It should be noted, however, that although where
the dual basis is recognized there would be no inconsistency in
holding apparent possibility sufficient for conviction on the tort
theory while actual possibility is needed to establish an attempt
to commit a battery, the cases rarely give any such intimation."
The logical position is that one may be guilty of an assault by
attempting to shoot another with a gun that one mistakenly believes
to be loaded or by threatening with a gun that the other does not
know is unloaded. The indications are that this position will be
upheld. 6
It is interesting to note that while in most states the criminal
law concept of assault has been enlarged by the addition of the
tort theory, this has been almost entirely by judicial action."
But while several states have narrowed the concept of criminal as-
54. Price v. United States, 156 Fed. 950 (9th Cir. 1907); McNamara v.
People, 24 Colo. 61, 48 Pac. 541 (1897); Crumbley v. State, 61 Ga. 582
(1878); State v. Shepard, 10 Iowa 126 (1859); State v. Coyle, 103 Kan.
750, 175 Pac. 971 (1918); Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872);
Ford v. State, 71 Neb. 246, 98 N.W. 807 (1904); People v. Wood, 10 App.
Div. 2d 231, 199 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1960); People v. Morehouse, 6 N.Y.
Supp. 763 (Sup. Ct. 1889); State v. Atkinson, 141 N.C. 734, 53 S.E. 228
(1906); Clark v. State, 106 Pac. 803 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910); State v.
Smith, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 457 (1842). At one time the Texas statute
provided that "pointing an unloaded gun . .. cannot constitute an assault."
Mackay v. State, 44 Tex. 43, 45 (1875). Under the present Texas statute,
an assault is an attempt to commit a battery with present ability or an
attempt to alarm with a dangerous weapon. TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1138
(1961).
55. In reversing a conviction because of an instruction that would have
authorized a verdict of guilty even if both parties knew the weapon was
unloaded, the Tennessee court said that there must be circumstances "to
satisfy a jury that there was an intent, coupled with an ability, to do harm,
or that the other party had a right so to believe from the facts before him;
otherwise, there is no danger of a breach of the peace." Richels v. State,
33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 606, 609 (1854).
56. For example the Iowa court, in sustaining a conviction of assault
with intent to do great bodily injury, said:
[H]ow could defendant have intended to shoot the person assaulted
unless the gun which he held in his hands was, in fact, or, as he be-
lieved, so loaded as that it could be fired? If he believed that it was
loaded and intended to fire it at the person assaulted, he was guilty of
an assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, although in fact
and contrary to his belief it was not loaded.
State v. Mitchell, 139 Iowa 455, 459, 116 N.W. 808, 810 (1908).
57. Only Illinois and Louisiana have written the tort theory into their




sault by a statutory requirement of "present ability, ''ss only a few
jurisdictions have achieved the same result by judicial interpreta-
tion.59 Moreover, references to "such circumstances as denote at
the time an intention, coupled with the present ability"' do not
necessarily refer to actual present ability. Where criminal assault
has been enlarged by the addition of the tort theory, this reference
is to such circumstances as are sufficient to create a reasonable
apprehension of receiving an immediate battery on the part of the
other person.61
III. ATTEMPT TO ASSAULT
From what has been said, it is apparent that reference may be
made to an "attempt to assault" without logical absurdity. There
is nothing absurd in referring to an attempt to frighten, which
would constitute, if successful, a criminal assault in most juris-
dictions. Where an attempt to commit a battery with present ability
is the only basis on which a criminal assault may be established,
an "attempt to assault" would mean in substance an attempt to
commit a battery without present ability. Even where a criminal
assault still has its original meaning as an attempt to commit a
battery, reference to an attempt to assault is not necessarily absurd.
Because of the recognized difference between the requirement of
proximity for an assault and for a general criminal attempt, an
attempt to assault would indicate an effort to accomplish a battery
that had proceeded beyond the stage of preparation, but had not
58. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-241(A) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 41-601 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 240; CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-
33 (1953); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 18-901 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
55 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-402 (1956); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch.
130, § 21 (1954); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1141 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-1(1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-67 (1957). See also MoDE. PENAL
CODE § 201, app. H (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Under such a statute, it is
error to instruct that apparent present ability is sufficient. Pratt v. State,
49 Ark. 179,4 S.W. 785 (1887).
59. Flournoy v. State, 270 Ala. 448, 120 So. 2d 124 (1960); Chapman
v. State, 78 Ala. 463 (1885); Burton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 295, 62 So.
394 (1913); State v. Lasby, 174 A.2d 323 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961); State
v. Wilson, 218 Ore. 575, 346 P.2d 115 (1959); State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore.
300, 20 Pac. 625 (1889). The Maine court has said that a statute defining
assault in the terms "whoever unlawfully attempts to strike, hit, touch...
having an intention and existing ability .. ... was a codification of com-
mon-law assault. State v. Rand, 156 Me. 81, 161 A.2d 852 (1960); State v.
Mahoney, 122 Me. 483, 120 AUt. 543 (1923).
60. Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
61. Compare Huffnan v. State, 200 Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738 (1956),
which includes such a reference, with State v. Smith, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.)




come close enough to completion to constitute an assault. It is not
surprising, therefore, that there is a tendency to break away from
the ancient view that there is no such offense known to the law
as an attempt to commit an assault.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF AN ATTEMPT TO ASSAULT
One of the earliest steps toward recognition of an attempt to
commit an assault was in O'Connell, 2 a New York case. The
charge was assault with a deadly weapon, and the prosecution was
persuaded to accept a plea of guilty of an attempt to commit the of-
fense. The defendant appealed from the conviction on the ground
that the crime of which he had been convicted did not exist. In
affirming the conviction, the court pointed out that to be guilty
of an assault the defendant would have to be within reach of his
intended victim, but he could be guilty of an attempt by arming
himself and attempting to reach him.
Almost at the same time the Montana court, in Herron,"3
took the same position almost by default. The information was for
"an attempt to commit an assault with a deadly weapon, with the
intent to commit a violent injury." A verdict of acquittal was di-
rected for lack of proof that the weapon was loaded. In holding
this to have been erroneous, the court said: "This case is a prose-
cution for an attempt. The attempt is clear. The intent is express-
ly declared by defendant himself. The ability is proven, that is, if
the gun was loaded."64 The court held that the fact the gun was
unloaded, if such was the fact, is a matter of defense to be estab-
lished by the defendant, and that the use of the weapon in this
manner gives rise to a presumption that it is loaded. The fact that
the information charged an attempt to assault rather than an as-
sault was not discussed. A few years later, the same court said in
affirming a directed verdict of not guilty: "We have not been called
upon to consider whether this defendant might have been con-
victed of an attempt to commit an assault or of any other crime."6
The Alabama court was confronted with the problem more
directly.6" In a trial under an indictment charging an assault with
62. People v. O'Connell, 60 Hun 109, 14 N.Y. Supp. 485 (Sup. Ct.
1891). Loose statements can be found much earlier, however. For example:
"We hold, that if a slave, in the attempt, unjustifiably, to commit an as-
sault, or assault and battery, on another slave, kill a white person by mis-
adventure, he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter .... " Bob (a Slave)
v. State, 29 Ala. 20, 25 (1856). This statement was made in a murder case
in which Bob had unquestionably attempted to commit a battery upon
another slave.
63. State v. Herron, 12 Mont. 230, 29 Pac. 819 (1892).
64. Id. at 234, 29 Pac. at 820.
65. State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598, 604, 124 Pac. 775, 777 (1912).
66. White v. State, 107 Ala. 132, 18 So. 226 (1894).
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intent to murder, it was shown that D threatened to kill X, and
pulled from his pocket a pistol, which was immediately taken
from him by a police officer. A request to charge the jury that D
was not guilty unless he actually presented the pistol at X was
refused, and this refusal was relied upon as error. In affirming
the conviction, the appellate court held that the requested instruc-
tion was faulty because if the pistol had not been presented, D
might have been convicted of an attempt to commit an assault.
Sometime later, in Burton,67 the Alabama Court of Appeals
made what seems to be the most helpful analysis of this
type of case. D was indicted for assault with intent to rape, which
was a statutory felony. The evidence showed that D accosted a fif-
teen-year-old girl at a remote spot and, as she fled screaming, ran
after her for about a hundred yards, but then abandoned his pur-
suit without touching her. D was convicted of an "attempt to com-
mit an assault with intent to rape." In affirming the conviction, the
appellate court pointed out that: (1) an attempt to rape is a mis-
demeanor at common law and recognized as an offense under the
law of the state; (2) an assault requires a present ability to do
the threatened harm, but an attempt to commit rape requires only
an apparent ability to do so; (3) if an attempt to rape falls short
of an assault, it constitutes the misdemeanor of attempted rape;
and (4) the verdict finding D guilty of an "attempt to commit an
assault with intent to rape" can only mean that he was found guilty
of "an attempt to commit rape."6 And much more recently, in
affirming a conviction worded in terms of an attempt to commit
an assault with intent to rape, the same court repeated, quoting
from Burton, " 'an attempt to commit an assault with intent to
rape' ... means an attempt to rape which has not proceeded far
enough to amount to an assault."69 In other words, if trial judges
and jurors talk in terms of an attempt to commit an assault with
intent to rape, this will be accepted as synonymous with an at-
tempt to rape, which has always been recognized as a crime in
Alabama.
The New Hampshire court, in refusing to quash an indictment,
emphasized that the charging part of the pleading rather than the
name used by the pleading determines the offense of which the
defendant is accused.7" The charge was that D attempted to make
67. Burton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 295, 62 So. 394 (1913).
68. Id. at 297, 62 So. at 395.
69. McQuirter v. State, 36 Ala. App. 707, 709, 63 So. 2d 388, 390(1953). See also Morris v. State, 32 Ala. App. 278, 25 So. 2d 54 (1946).
70. State v. Skillings, 98 N.H. 203, 97 A.2d 202 (1953). For reference
to "an attempt to commit the crime of assault and battery," see Smith v.
State, 79 Okla. Crim. 1, 27, 151 P.2d 74, 87 (1944).
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an aggravated assault upon a woman by means of drugs capable
of rendering her unconscious and inflicting serious physical in-
jury upon her. D moved to quash the indictment upon the ground,
inter alia, that since an assault may be no more than an attempt
to commit a battery, an attempted assault is no more than an at-
tempted attempt and, therefore, not a crime. In rejecting this con-
tention, the court pointed out that according to the statute an as-
sault or battery "of an aggravated nature" is a felony. Since the
prosecution alleged not merely an "attempt to attempt" to commit
a battery (an attempted assault), but an attempt to commit a bat-
tery of an aggravated nature, the indictment sufficiently alleged
the attempt within the meaning of the statute punishing attempts.
The most significant case in point is Wilson,7 which was de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1959. D confronted and
threatened his estranged wife in her place of employment, and
then procured a shotgun from his car just outside to carry out his
threat. He was unable to re-enter, however, because his wife se-
cured herself safely behind locked doors. A prosecution for assault
with a dangerous weapon resulted in a conviction of attempt to
commit the offense charged. An appeal was taken primarily upon
the ground that there is no such offense as that of which D had
been convicted. In affirming the judgment of conviction, the Ore-
gon court attempted to dispel forever the notion that there can be
no attempt to assault. After discussing the problem obiter under
a different definition of assault,"2 the court said, "we are of the
opinion that criminal assault, even as defined by this court, should
be regarded as a distinct crime rather than as an uncompleted bat-
tery."73 This is quite unconvincing in view of the fact that the
term, used in the Oregon statute without definition, is defined by
the court as an attempt to commit a battery by one having present
ability.7" There was no intention of relying upon this point alone,
as shown by this statement: "Assume that we are forced to deal
with an attempt to attempt to commit a battery, is there any rea-
son why we cannot and should not bring such conduct within the
law of criminal attempt generally?"7 5 The negative answer in-
cluded the following:
The mere fact that assault is viewed as preceding a battery should
not preclude us from drawing a line on one side of which we require
the present ability to inflict corporal injury, denominating this an as-
71. State v. Wilson, 218 Ore. 575, 346 P.2d 115 (1959).
72. Id. at 582, 346 P.2d at 119.
73. Id. at 586, 346 P.2d at 120.
74. Ibid.
75. Id. at 585, 346 P.2d at 120.
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sault, and on the other side conduct which falls short of a prescnt
ability, yet so advanced toward the assault that it is more than mere
preparation and which we denominate an attempt.78
B. BASES OF AN ATTEMPT TO ASSAULT
While the notion of an attempt to assault as a logical absurdity
has been dispelled, steps taken to recognize it as a punishable
offense have been, and probably should continue to be, very
limited in scope. These steps have been based primarily on four
theories.
1. Attempts to Frighten
One judge has taken the position that "fright is such bodily
harm that to shoot in the general direction of a person, with in-
tent to 'bluff or scare' him, is an assault."' If this were true, then
an unlawful attempt to place another in apprehension of receiving
an immediate battery would, if successful, be an accomplished bat-
tery. But, while the unlawful creation of such apprehension is rec-
ognized as a criminal assault in most jurisdictions, no case has been
found in which it has been held to constitute a battery.
Wilson contains an elaborate dictum to the effect that an at-
tempt to frighten would constitute the offense of attempt to assault
in any jurisdiction where criminal assault may be established on
the tort theory.78 In Rhode Island, which is such a jurisdiction,
the judge incorporated this idea in his instructions to the jury in
a case in which the defendant unquestionably placed another in
apprehension.79 But this point was not raised on appeal because
defense counsel admitted that an assault had been committed,
claiming only that it was not an assault with a dangerous weapon.
Shooting in the direction of another, even without an attempt
to hit him, is such a reckless and dangerous act that it should be
made punishable even if it results neither in hitting anyone nor
in placing anyone in apprehension of being hit. It would seem
wiser, however, to take this step by legislation, such as that pro-
viding a penalty for improper use of weaponsso or for endangering
76. Id. at 588, 346 P.2d at 121. The court added: "The contrary view
is little more than a barren logical construction." Id. at 590, 346 P.2d at 122.
77. Edwards v. State, 4 Ga. App. 167, 171, 60 S.E. 1033, 1035 (1908)(Powell, J., concurring). When the case, which had been reversed for
other reasons, came up again, Powell wrote the opinion and included the
same statement. Edwards v. State, 4 Ga. App. 849, 850, 62 S.E. 565
(1908). He used somewhat similar language in a later case. Smallwood
v. State, 9 Ga. App. 300, 70 S.E. 1124 (1911).
78. State v. Wilson, 218 Ore. 575, 582, 346 P.2d 115, 119 (1959).
79. State v. Baker, 20 R.I. 275, 38 Atl. 653 (1897).
80. CAL. PEN. CODE § 417.
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another by reckless conduct,"' than by broadening the scope of
criminal assault. Criminal assault so broadly conceived would in-
clude any number of futile attempts to frighten or startle that are
too insignificant to be added to the category of crime.
2. Lack of Present Ability
Wilson held that an effort to commit a battery that goes beyond
preparation but lacks the element of "present ability" is punishable
as an attempt to assault. Because the statute in Wilson imposed
a penalty without a definition of assault, the court was not con-
fronted with a problem that would be involved in a state where
criminal assault is defined by statute as an attempt to commit a
battery by one having present ability. Under the doctrine of mani-
fested legislative intent, an omission from a penal provision
evinces a legislative purpose not to punish the omitted act.8" There-
fore, if a statute defines criminal assault as an attempt to commit
a battery by one having present ability and no offense known as
an attempt to assault was recognized at the time the statute was
adopted, then there would be a clear manifestation of legislative
intent under this doctrine that an attempt to commit a battery
without present ability should go unpunished. It would be wise to
amend the statute by eliminating the requirement of present ability,
but this should be done by the legislative body and not by "judicial
amendment."
3. Lack of Proximity
In O'Connell the New York court took the position that an effort
to commit a battery that goes beyond preparation, but does not
come close enough to completion to constitute an assault, is punish-
able as an attempt to commit an assault. If such misconduct is to
be punished, it would seem more logical to charge an attempt to
commit a battery rather than an attempt to commit an assault.
In other words, two grades or degrees of attempt to commit a
battery should be recognized-one coming very close to the in-
tended victim and denominated an "assault," the other more re-
mote and known only as an "attempt to commit a battery."
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-5 (1961).
82. For example, if a statutory offense involves a transaction between two
persons and provides a penalty for only one of them, the other may not be
convicted as a conspirator, an inciter, or an abettor, since the omission
evinces a legislative purpose to leave his participation unpunished. Gebardi
v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932); United States v. Farrar, 281 U.S.
624 (1930); Wilson v. State, 130 Ark. 204, 196 S.W. 921 (1917); State v.





Burton emphasized that an attempt to commit an assault with
intent to rape is not the name of a crime, but is merely a descrip-
tion of the offense of attempted rape. The same is true of other
"assaults with intent," such as assault with intent to murder or to
rob. As an attempt to commit the designated felony is a lesser in-
cluded offense, the conviction should be for the attempt where it,
but not the assault, is established by the evidence.
Some aggravated assaults, such as assault with a dangerous
weapon, include no lesser offense other than simple assault. In
Wilson the court took the position that an assault, although de-
fined as an attempt to commit a battery, was a separate substan-
tive offense rather than an uncommitted battery. The court would
have been much more convincing if, instead of speaking of simple
assault, it had declared that since the statutory crime of assault with
a dangerous weapon was unknown to the common law, it was a
separate substantive offense and not an uncommitted battery. This
would not have been entirely novel since it was intimated about
a century ago by Bishops3 and more recently by Thurman Ar-
nold.8 4
IV. BATTERY INCLUDES ASSAULT
A problem related to attempt to assault arises out of the age-
old assertion that every battery includes an assault.' This was a
logical conclusion when a criminal assault was simply an attempt
to commit a battery and a battery was assumed to be a personal
harm perpetrated intentionally. A right to recover damages for
negligent injury was recognized in the early days, but under com-
mon-law pleading the action was not trespass for battery but tres-
pass on the case; 6 hence, the word "battery" was not used in tort
law unless the harm was intentional. It has long been recognized,
however, that a criminal battery may be unintentional, as where
83. "It would seem, therefore, not possible [that] there should be an in-
dictable attempt to commit a simple assault. Yet perhaps there may be
such to commit an aggravated or compound assault . " 2 BISHOP, NEw
CRmiNAL LAw § 62 (8th ed. 1892).
84. Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40
YALE L. 53, 65 (1930).
85. See note 8 supra. See also State v. Mills, 19 Del. (3 Penne.) 508, 52
Atl. 266 (1902); State v. Grayson, 50 N.M. 147, 172 P.2d 1019 (1946);
State v. Green, 84 Ohio App. 298, 82 N.E.2d 105 (1948); Wood v. Com-
monwealth, 149 Va. 401, 140 S.E. 114 (1927).
86. RESTATEME,, TORTS, Explanatory Notes §§ 13-17, at 27 (1934).
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personal injury results from criminal negligence 87 or from the
perpetration of an unlawful act malum in se.88
This seems to suggest that a battery could be committed with-
out an assault. This conclusion would be inescapable except for
the well-known fact that terms used in criminal definitions are not
always limited to their literal meanings. Suppose, for example, that
X steals a pearl necklace and offers to sell it to D for only a fraction
of its true value, telling D that he inherited it, but needs to raise
money quickly; D, however, is convinced that X stole the necklace
although he has no actual knowledge of how it was acquired. If
D hands over the money and takes the necklace, he will be guilty
of receiving stolen property. 9 Although the definition of this
crime is in terms of a "person who buys or receives property which
has been stolen . . . knowing the same to be so stolen,""0 the
word "knowing" means "knowing or believing."'" In like man-
ner, when the phrase "attempt to commit a battery" is employed
in the definition of criminal assault, the legal signification is an
"attempt to commit a battery or an actual battery."'" Even where
the statute defines assault as an attempt to commit a battery,
courts say that "a battery cannot be committed without assaulting
the victim"'" or that "when the assault culminates in a battery
the offense is assault and battery... ."I
Such expressions as "a blow inflicted in the former manner
87. Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927); Tift v. State,
17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916); Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va.
210, 83 S.E.2d 369 (1954). For a scholarly discussion of battery based upon
criminal negligence, see Hall, Assault and Battery by the Reckless Motorist,
31 J. CRIM. L. & C. 133 (1940).
88. McGee v. State, 4 Ala. 54, 58 So. 1008 (1912); King v. State, 157
Tenn. 635, 11 S.W.2d 904 (1928).
89. Lewis v. State, 81 Okla. Crim. 168, 172, 162 P.2d 201, 203 (1945);
Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 451, 65 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951).
90. CAL. PEN. CODE § 496.
91. Meath v. State, 174 Wis. 80, 83, 182 N.W. 334, 335 (1921).
92. "Liability for assault has been imposed for reckless conduct causing
injury, although ordinarily an assault (as distinguished from a battery) re-
quires an intent to injure, or at least to alarm. But these cases involve no
more than interpreting the term 'assault' to include also a battery . .. .
Hall, supra note 87, at 157. This has been spelled out in the MODEL PENAL
CODE § 211.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
(1) Simple Assault. A person is guilty of an assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another; or
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon. ...
93. People v. McCaffrey, 118 Cal. App. 2d 611, 618, 258 P.2d 557,
562 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
94. Hall v. State, 309 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (syl-
labus by the court).
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would constitute an assault""5 and "the assault alleged was a
deliberate touching" of an unlawful nature" clearly indicate that
actual battery is included within the definition of criminal assault
since the courts are thinking of "assault" in terms of actual con-
tact. Also significant is the tendency to prosecute for "assault"
although a battery has clearly been committed.IT Even more con-
vincing are the assault cases in which there was no actual attempt
to commit a battery. Thus the crime of "assault and battery" has
been committed if personal injury to another has resulted unin-
tentionally, but through criminal negligence,98 or where an in-
jury has resulted unintentionally from an act malum in se. 99 In
such prosecutions, it is not necessary for the accusatory pleading
even to mention the word "battery" because proof of the battery
will support a conviction of simple assault 10 or, if the facts war-
95. State v. Schutte, 87 N.I.L. 15, 18, 93 Ad. 112, 114 (Sup. CL
1915).
96. Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
97. See, e.g., Medlin v. United States, 207 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 905 (1954) (kicking another with shoes constitutes
assault with a deadly weapon); Smith v. State, 105 Ala. 136, 17 So. 107
(1895) (seizing and holding another); Bonner v. State, 97 Ala. 47, 12 So.
408 (1893) (rolling a bale of cotton onto another); State v. Lankford, 29
Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 Ad. 63 (1917) (communication of a disease);
Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135 (D.C. Mun. App. 1953) (unlawful
touching); Allen v. People, 82 Ill. 610 (1876) (striking another over the
head with a pistol); Carr v. State, 135 Ind. 1, 34 N.E. 533 (1893) (admin-
istration of poison); Rakes v. State, 227 Md. 172, 175 A.2d 579 (1961)
(severe beating of a police officer); Commonwealth v. Cooley, 72 Mass.(6 Gray) 350 (1856) (excessive force in quelling an apparent fight); State
v. Kinney, 34 Minn. 311, 25 N.W. 705 (1885) (putting a trespasser off a
train in motion); State v. Kunkel, 244 S.W. 968 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922)(hugging and kissing a woman against her will); State v. Norman, 237 N.C.
205, 74 S.E.2d 602 (1953) (choking); State v. Hedrick, 95 N.C. 624
(1886) (tripping another and causing him to fall); Hand v. State, 88 Tex.
Crim. 422, 227 S.W. 194 (1921) (indecent familiarity with a woman);
Skidmore v. State, 2 Tex. Crim. 20 (1877) (beating of a prisoner by a
policeman).
98. This arises most frequently from criminal negligence in the operation
of an automobile. Wellons v. State, 77 Ga. App. 652, 48 S.E.2d 922 (1948);
Tilt v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916); Woodward v. State, 164
Miss. 468, 144 So. 895 (1932); State v. Schutte, 87 NJ.L. 15, 93 Ad. 112
(Sup. Ct. 1915); State v. Suddreth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828 (1922).
See also Fish v. Michigan, 62 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1933); Medley v. State,
156 Ala. 78, 47 So. 218 (1909) (criminal negligence in firing a gun);
Hill v. State, 63 Ga. 578 (1879) (criminal negligence in throwing a stone).
99. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 312 Mass. 557, 45 N.E.2d 742 (1942)(an attempted suicide); Commonwealth v. Mann, 116 Mass. 58 (1874);
State v. Lehman, 131 Minn. 427, 430, 155 N.W. 399, 400 (1915) (a shot
fired with intent only to frighten another).
100. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N.E. 862 (1893);
State v. Lehman, 131 Minn. 427, 155 N.W. 399 (1915); State v. Browers,
356 Mo. 1195,.205 S.W.2d 721 (1947); State v. McLean, 234 N.C. 283,
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rant, of aggravated assault. 0 1 Many penal codes make no special
provision for aggravated battery; it is unnecessary because battery
includes assault, and the statutes providing penalties for aggravated
assaults will cover such misdeeds. 2 Thus it was not error to
instruct in terms of "aggravated assault and battery"'1 3 in a
trial for aggravated assault in which a battery was clearly estab-
lished. The fact that a conviction of aggravated assault is warranted
by proof of a corresponding aggravated battery has been so obvious
as to induce courts to emphasize the lack of any requirement of ac-
tual injury or contact.0 4
Some courts have rationalized these cases in terms of a fiction
-the law will presume an intent to injure from an injury caused
by criminal negligence. 5 Others have spoken more frankly:
"[A]ssault may be . . .done simply by operating the vehicle in
such a reckless, heedless, and criminally negligent manner as to
run him down without having any specific intent so to do."'00 As
explained by one writer after exhaustive research, "there can be no
67 S.E.2d 75 (1951). See also Rex v. Chapin, 22 Cox Crim. Cas. 10 (Cent.
Crim. Ct. 1909), where in an effort to make voting papers illegible, a
woman broke a bottle of some chemical over a ballot box and unintentionally
splashed some of it on another's face with harmful results; this was held
to constitute a common assault.
101. People v. Henderson, 34 Cal. 2d 340, 209 P.2d 785 (1949); People
v. Weaver, 71 Cal. App. 2d 685, 163 P.2d 456 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945);
Bailey v. State, 101 Ga. App. 81, 113 S.E.2d 172 (1960); State v. Patter-
son, 60 Idaho 67, 88 P.2d 493 (1939); People v. Benson, 321 111. 605, 152
N.E. 514 (1926); Lane v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 192, 84 P.2d 807 (1938);
State v. Cancelmo, 86 Ore. 379, 168 Pac. 721 (1917).
102. This has been spelled out in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962):
(2) Aggravated Assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(a) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
causes such injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under cir-
cumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life; or
(b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon.
103. Gaston v. State, 11 Tex. Crim. 143 (1881).
104. People v. Rader, 24 Cal. App. 477, 141 Pac. 958 (Dist. Ct. App.
1914); Lindsey v. State, 67 Fla. 111, 64 So. 501 (1914).
105. "The law has regard for personal safety and human life and if one
with reckless indifference to results injures another it holds him to have
intended the consequences of his act and treats him as if he had done an
intentional wrong." Fish v. Michigan, 62 F.2d 659, 661 (6th Cir. 1933).
Accord, Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N.E. 640 (1912); State v.
Schutte, 87 N.J.L. 15, 19, 93 Atl. 112, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1915). See also State
v. Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 Atd. 63 (1917). Compare State
v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 785, 162 N.W. 28, 33 (1917), in which a
conviction of assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury, based upon
criminal negligence was reversed, but the court said: 'This does not ex-
clude a conviction for assault and battery, or assault."
106. Bailey v. State, 101 Ga. App. 81, 84, 113 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1960).
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assault without physical injury, unless there was an intention to in-
flict harm or at least to cause apprehension,' ' 07 but no such intent
is required for injurious assault. In the words of Mr. Justice Tray-
nor, speaking for the California Supreme Court in regard to battery,
"the assault, to adopt the statutory language, is 'necessarily in-
cluded therein.' "'s
CONCLUSION
Originally, "assault" as a criminal offense meant an attempt
to commit a battery, while "assault" as a tort meant an intentional
act wrongfully placing another in apprehension of receiving an
immediate battery. The original concept of criminal assault has
been changed by the incorporation of the tort concept and by
the addition of a requirement of present ability. After these
changes, it is more meaningful to speak of an attempt to assault
as a criminal offense. An attempt to assault has been based on:
(1) an attempt to frighten; (2) an attempt to commit a battery
without present ability; (3) an effort to commit a battery that
has gone beyond the stage of mere preparation, but has not come
close enough to completion to constitute an assault; and (4) an
attempt to commit an aggravated assault such as assault with in-
tent to murder or to rob. These are the only bases, however, upon
which attempts to assault should be made punishable offenses.
Also, because terms used in criminal definitions are not always
limited to their literal meanings, courts sometimes have interpreted
"assault', which is an intentional act, to include both an assault
and a battery, even though the battery may be an unintentional
act, such as an act of criminal negligence. This process has given
rise to the age-old assertion that "every battery includes an assault."
107. Hall, supra note 87, at 137. An assault has not been committed(without actual contact) when there was neither an intent to commit a
battery nor an intent to put the other in fear. State v. Storm, 124 Mont.
102, 220 P.2d 674 (1950); accord, Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 26 S.E.
748 (1896); State v. Chiavello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A.2d 506 (App. Div.
1961).
108. People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 597, 184 P.2d 512, 517 (1947),
quoted with approval in Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 640, 648,
328 P.2d 976, 981 (1958). The statute referred to is CAL. PEN. CODE §
1023, which provides that "conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged . . .or for an offense neces-
sarily included therein.. .."
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